Για περισσότερα γράψτε "shia pagan" σε κάποιο διαδικτυακό ψαχτήρι
Sectarianism: A History of the Shia-Sunni Divide
ΚΡΥΦΟ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ: ΕΜΦΑΝΙΣΗ
In the modern era, the Muslim world has seen intense upheaval and conflict, the bloodiest of which is attributable to religious and sectarian causes. While many people consider this as proof of Islam being an inherently violent religion, or as a reason to consider Muslims as savages, the relationship between politics, religion and violence here is much more complex. The purpose of this post is to provide a background of inter-sect relations between the two main denominations of Islam, Sunni and Shia, from the death of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) to the modern day, and how they contribute to instability in the region.
Most readers may be familiar with the migration of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the nascent Muslim community to Madinah in the year 622 to escape persecution from the people of Makkah. Once settled in their new home, the Muslim community in the city could be divided into two camps: the Muhajireen (Emigrants) who were the migrants from Makkah, and the Ansar (Helpers) who were the native population of Madinah who clothed, fed and sheltered the Muhajireen till the latter could stand on their own feet. The Muhajireen integrated remarkably well into Madinah's environment and there was little, if any tension between the two. However, after the death of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), there was a disagreement between the two regarding his successor: The Muhajireen believed that as the Prophet (PBUH) had been one of them and they had been his earliest supporters, the successor should also be one of them whereas the Ansar argued that they without their taking in of the Muhajireen and the aid they provided to the cause of Islam, the religion may well have been crushed and thus, they were deserving of the succession. To discuss who to nominate as Caliph, the leaders of the Ansar met at the Saqifa Banu Saidah, the house of one of the Ansar leaders, while the Holy Prophet (PBUH) was dying. Just as he passed away, his companions found out about the meeting. Abu Bakr, Umar ibn Khattab and Abu Ubaidah bin Jarrah, three of the Prophet'S (PBUH) closest companions, made their way to Saqifa, where Umar nominated Abu Bakr; all present agreed and Abu Bakr was elected the first of the Rightly Guided Caliphs in Sunni belief.
This was where the first split in the Muslim community formed. Ali, the Prophet's (PBUH) cousin, son-in-law and close companion, was bathing the Prophet's (PBUH) body in preparation for the funeral and was not informed of these events till they had already transpired. While subsequent Sunni and Shia accounts of his reaction differ, there is a wide consensus that he was disappointed in not being consulted and that several of the Prophet's (PBUH) companions did not initially give bayah (oath of allegiance) to Abu Bakr as they supported Ali. Ali's supporters, the Shiatu Ali (Party of Ali) claimed that the Prophet (PBUH) had indicated Ali as his successor, based on numerous instances such as the Hadith of Khumm, which is accepted by both Sunnis and Shias as valid. However, the Holy Prophet (PBUH) had delegated Abu Bakr to lead the prayers during his final illness and most Muslims were content to consider this as sufficient to endorse Abu Bakr; Ali himself gave Bayah to Abu Bakr not much later and was a close advisor on matters of state to Abu Bakr, Umar and Usman, all three of his predecessors as Caliph. However, there is much controversy over the death of Fatima, Ali's wife, who died not much after her father, the Prophet (PBUH) with the general Shia view alleging that she died from injuries sustained at the hands of Umar and other supporters of Abu Bakr trying to get Ali to give bayah, a view rejected by most Sunni scholars who claim she died due to grief for her father.
Ali eventually became Caliph in 656 after Usman's assassination, but his short rule was mostly occupied with civil wars, the major one of which was the rebellion by Muawiya bin Abu Sufyan, the governor of Syria. Muawiya belonged to the Banu Umayya clan, rivals of the Banu Hashim to which the Prophet (PBUH) and Ali belonged, and his father Abu Sufyan was one of the Prophet's (PBUH) fiercest enemies, surviving only due to the amnesty declared when Makkah surrendered to the Muslims. Muawiya used anger over the assassination of Uthman to drum up support for a rebellion; during the major battle at Siffin, Ali's forces appeared ascendant but the former ordered his troops to mount verses of the Quran on their lances, signifying a call for arbitration according to the Quran; this move caused a significant portion of Ali's army to stop fighting, forcing him to agree. The result of the arbitration was that both should vacate their posts, a decision against Ali due to his higher position and the fact that Muawiyah was a rebel. He refused to step down and was martyred not long after at the hands of the Kharjites, a group of fanatics with views not unlike today's ISIS. After his martyrdom, his son, Hasan ibn Ali, the grandson of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) became the lesser-known fifth Rightly Guided Caliph and only ruled for a few months, before abdicating in favour of Muawiya on some conditions, including that he would not form a dynasty to rule the Caliphate; Hasan retired to Medina where nine years later in 670, he was poisoned by one of his wives at Muawiyah's instigation.
This passed the Imamate to his brother, Hussain. Imam Hussain and other notable people such as Muhammad ibn Abu Bakr and Abdullah ibn Umar tolerated Muawiyah as he was a competent leader. However, near the end of his reign, Muawiyah nominated his son Yazid as his successor, and started ordering people to take bayah at Yazid's hand. Imam Hussain was among the few who refused to do so, even when threatened, as he viewed it as a violation of the treaty that his brother had signed. The issue became a full-blown dispute when Muawiyah died and Yazid became Caliph. The people of Kufa seemed receptive to his message and invited the Imam to their city to preach among them. Imam Hussain agreed and dispatched his cousin, Muslim bin Aqeel, to Kufa to gauge support and take bayah on his behalf. Hussain departed from Madinah to Kufa with his family, but in the interim, Yazid replaced the governer of Kufa with one of his own men, Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad, who arrested and executed Muslim, and dispersed the pro-Hussain feeling in the city. Hussain received this news when he had already commenced his journey and was close to the city. He decided to continue onwards but ibn Ziyad received orders from Yazid to gain bayah from the Imam at any cost and blocked his path with an army at a place called Karbala. They also cut off the supply of water to his camp by preventing access to the nearby Euphrates River. The Imam again refused to bow to Yazid and as a result, the battle of Karbala was fought on the 10th of Muharram, where the Imam and 72 of his companions, including almost all the male descendants of the Prophet (PBUH) at the time were martyred. The Umayyad army did not even spare the Imam's six month old son, Ali al Asghar. The remainder of the caravan, mostly women and children, were forcefully marched to Damascus where Yazid and his court mocked the Imam, but were silenced by a speech given by Zainab bint Ali, the Imam's sister; among other things, she affirmed that her kin were martyrs in Paradise and vowed that Yazid and his supporters would face justice on the Day of Resurrection. In response, Yazid imprisoned the Ahlul Bayt, the family of the Prophet (PBUH), but was forced to release them when ordinary people started crowding the prison to learn about the events of Karbala.
The events of Karbala were not only some of the most tragic in the history of Islam, but also acted as a catalyst for many others. Imam Hussain's sacrifice and martyrdom inspired many anti-Yazid people to rise in revolt and although the Umayyads crushed them, they would soon be toppled by the Abbasids, who capitalized on the anger among the populace over the treatment of the Ahlul Bayt. More importantly, this brought about a schism in Islam that split it into two. Overnight, the Shia went from being a politically oriented group to a separate religious sect that laid emphasis on devotion to the Ahlul Bayt and the Imams. The Abbasids did not prove to be any better however; while most Muslims were against the slaughter of the Ahlul Bayt, the Abbasids were suspicious that the Imams would seek to press their claim to the Caliphate and thus, encouraged persecution of the Shia. All of the Imams in the Abbasid period, starting from Imam Jafar al Sadiq till Imam Askari, were poisoned at the instigation of the Abbasid Caliphs. However, the Shias began to spread slowly, centered around Iraq and spreading outwards, and received a boost from the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate by the Mongols, which ended state repression. Till the 16th century, many of the Shias in the Middle East belonged to non-Twelver denominations like Ismailis, Bektashis etc. The establishment of the Safavid Empire in Iran changed that. The Safavids imported Shia scholars from the Middle East, provided support for Shia proselytizing and religious works, and heavily persecuted Sunnis; as a result, a majority Sunni land was quickly, if violently, converted to mostly Twelver Shia belief within a few generations. Due to the power of the Safavids at their height, the neighboring, majority-Sunni Ottoman Empire viewed the Shia in its own lands with suspicion and continued the Abbasid practice of Shia persecution, as did the Mughal Empire in South Asia to a smaller extent. [1] [2]
In the 20th century, Sunni-Shia relations improved due to national struggles and joint pan-Muslim causes such as the Khilafat Movement in South Asia to save the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s and the anti-Zionist struggle against Israel which united many Muslims across the world against a common enemy. However, this progress stalled and in fact, started taking steps backwards due to the spread of Wahhabism and Salafism. Prior to the 1970s, these austere ideologies were primarily confined to the Arabian Peninsula, making up a tiny fraction of Sunni Muslims. However, new-found oil wealth allowed the Gulf States, primarily Saudi Arabia, to pour petrodollars into Wahhabi literature, mosques, madrassas and aid programs, especially in South Asia and the West. This caused the two inter-linked movements to grow rapidly, contributing to the increasing conservatism of many Muslim and Arab societies in comparison to the 60s and 70s. The rise of these movements contributed to deteriorating inter-sect relations as they do not believe in the concept of shrines, which on the other hand are a staple of Shia religious thinking. Also, these movements are far more liberal in the application of takfir or excommunication than mainstream Sunnis and have often labeled Shias to be murtad (apostates), often worse than non-Muslims. Interestingly, many Salafists in the West are new converts rather than already Muslim and most of the Muslims involved in terror acts there are self-taught and generally religiously illiterate.[3]
The Gulf nations were generous patrons of Wahhabism for two main reasons: Firstly, it enabled the Gulf regimes to move firebrand or troublesome clerics out of their countries and into others, allowing them to rule more freely with a more subservient clergy. Secondly, the Islamic Revolution in Iran shook the Middle East, showing that even the most powerful of the monarchs in the region could be toppled. Terrified of this being repeated in their countries and suspicious of their own Shia populations, the Gulf rulers found it convenient to paint the Shias as the enemy and use the spectre of the Persian Safavids coming to violently spread Shia ideology in a way to drum up support and divert their populations from thinking too deeply about the illegitimacy of kingdoms in Islam and stifling restrictions at home. As a result, inter-sect harmony has deteriorated in virtually every country around the world, though current relations vary: for instance, in the Persian Gulf region and the Levant, there are tensions between the communities and even open war as in Syria, where Sunni rebels fight a generally Shia-backed government. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, the rise of extremist groups such as the Taliban,Sipah e Sahaba and Lashkar e Jhangvi have resulted in the targeting of Shia intellectuals, mourning processions in Muharram, and imambargahs/mosques. However, support for such attacks is confined to a minority and the majority of Sunnis and Shias in South Asia continue to coexist in relative harmony. [4]
Some may continue to wonder why rivalries in this region are so deeply rooted in religion and events that occurred centuries ago. To understand that, we must look at the concept of the Ummah. In Islam, all followers of the religion are declared to be one nation, in other words deconstructing national and racial boundaries in favor of a more inclusive system where race and origin do not matter, at least in theory.[5] Since the Muslim conquest of the Middle East took place so rapidly, and subsequent conquests and proselytizing engaged a diverse range of geographically separated peoples, the only common identity with which to bind empires and nation-states together was the concept of Islamic brotherhood. Thus, religion has always been the tool of choice with which rulers have enforced their will upon the region and have also been toppled. With the Shia, a further incentive for cohesion is their status as a minority; Of the 1.5 billion Muslims worldwide, only 200 million or 15% are estimated to be Shias. [6]
To sum up, the Shia-Sunni relationship is less a victim of theological differences and more that of political games and power hungry leaders on both sides. In the end, it is not that Muslims or savages or Islam is dangerous, but that the Middle East and Muslims are victims, earlier of colonialist mindsets among foreign powers and now, of their own ignorance and narrow-mindedness. Most members of each group do live in harmony with each other across the world and where they don't, one can hope that technology and open minds can achieve that soon.
Sources:
1 http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-h ... _infoguide
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%8 ... _relations
3 http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk ... nd-alone-0
4 http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview. ... wahhabism/
5 http://eng.dar-alifta.org/foreign/ViewA ... tegoryID=3
6 http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapp ... opulation/
Most readers may be familiar with the migration of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the nascent Muslim community to Madinah in the year 622 to escape persecution from the people of Makkah. Once settled in their new home, the Muslim community in the city could be divided into two camps: the Muhajireen (Emigrants) who were the migrants from Makkah, and the Ansar (Helpers) who were the native population of Madinah who clothed, fed and sheltered the Muhajireen till the latter could stand on their own feet. The Muhajireen integrated remarkably well into Madinah's environment and there was little, if any tension between the two. However, after the death of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), there was a disagreement between the two regarding his successor: The Muhajireen believed that as the Prophet (PBUH) had been one of them and they had been his earliest supporters, the successor should also be one of them whereas the Ansar argued that they without their taking in of the Muhajireen and the aid they provided to the cause of Islam, the religion may well have been crushed and thus, they were deserving of the succession. To discuss who to nominate as Caliph, the leaders of the Ansar met at the Saqifa Banu Saidah, the house of one of the Ansar leaders, while the Holy Prophet (PBUH) was dying. Just as he passed away, his companions found out about the meeting. Abu Bakr, Umar ibn Khattab and Abu Ubaidah bin Jarrah, three of the Prophet'S (PBUH) closest companions, made their way to Saqifa, where Umar nominated Abu Bakr; all present agreed and Abu Bakr was elected the first of the Rightly Guided Caliphs in Sunni belief.
This was where the first split in the Muslim community formed. Ali, the Prophet's (PBUH) cousin, son-in-law and close companion, was bathing the Prophet's (PBUH) body in preparation for the funeral and was not informed of these events till they had already transpired. While subsequent Sunni and Shia accounts of his reaction differ, there is a wide consensus that he was disappointed in not being consulted and that several of the Prophet's (PBUH) companions did not initially give bayah (oath of allegiance) to Abu Bakr as they supported Ali. Ali's supporters, the Shiatu Ali (Party of Ali) claimed that the Prophet (PBUH) had indicated Ali as his successor, based on numerous instances such as the Hadith of Khumm, which is accepted by both Sunnis and Shias as valid. However, the Holy Prophet (PBUH) had delegated Abu Bakr to lead the prayers during his final illness and most Muslims were content to consider this as sufficient to endorse Abu Bakr; Ali himself gave Bayah to Abu Bakr not much later and was a close advisor on matters of state to Abu Bakr, Umar and Usman, all three of his predecessors as Caliph. However, there is much controversy over the death of Fatima, Ali's wife, who died not much after her father, the Prophet (PBUH) with the general Shia view alleging that she died from injuries sustained at the hands of Umar and other supporters of Abu Bakr trying to get Ali to give bayah, a view rejected by most Sunni scholars who claim she died due to grief for her father.
Ali eventually became Caliph in 656 after Usman's assassination, but his short rule was mostly occupied with civil wars, the major one of which was the rebellion by Muawiya bin Abu Sufyan, the governor of Syria. Muawiya belonged to the Banu Umayya clan, rivals of the Banu Hashim to which the Prophet (PBUH) and Ali belonged, and his father Abu Sufyan was one of the Prophet's (PBUH) fiercest enemies, surviving only due to the amnesty declared when Makkah surrendered to the Muslims. Muawiya used anger over the assassination of Uthman to drum up support for a rebellion; during the major battle at Siffin, Ali's forces appeared ascendant but the former ordered his troops to mount verses of the Quran on their lances, signifying a call for arbitration according to the Quran; this move caused a significant portion of Ali's army to stop fighting, forcing him to agree. The result of the arbitration was that both should vacate their posts, a decision against Ali due to his higher position and the fact that Muawiyah was a rebel. He refused to step down and was martyred not long after at the hands of the Kharjites, a group of fanatics with views not unlike today's ISIS. After his martyrdom, his son, Hasan ibn Ali, the grandson of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) became the lesser-known fifth Rightly Guided Caliph and only ruled for a few months, before abdicating in favour of Muawiya on some conditions, including that he would not form a dynasty to rule the Caliphate; Hasan retired to Medina where nine years later in 670, he was poisoned by one of his wives at Muawiyah's instigation.
This passed the Imamate to his brother, Hussain. Imam Hussain and other notable people such as Muhammad ibn Abu Bakr and Abdullah ibn Umar tolerated Muawiyah as he was a competent leader. However, near the end of his reign, Muawiyah nominated his son Yazid as his successor, and started ordering people to take bayah at Yazid's hand. Imam Hussain was among the few who refused to do so, even when threatened, as he viewed it as a violation of the treaty that his brother had signed. The issue became a full-blown dispute when Muawiyah died and Yazid became Caliph. The people of Kufa seemed receptive to his message and invited the Imam to their city to preach among them. Imam Hussain agreed and dispatched his cousin, Muslim bin Aqeel, to Kufa to gauge support and take bayah on his behalf. Hussain departed from Madinah to Kufa with his family, but in the interim, Yazid replaced the governer of Kufa with one of his own men, Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad, who arrested and executed Muslim, and dispersed the pro-Hussain feeling in the city. Hussain received this news when he had already commenced his journey and was close to the city. He decided to continue onwards but ibn Ziyad received orders from Yazid to gain bayah from the Imam at any cost and blocked his path with an army at a place called Karbala. They also cut off the supply of water to his camp by preventing access to the nearby Euphrates River. The Imam again refused to bow to Yazid and as a result, the battle of Karbala was fought on the 10th of Muharram, where the Imam and 72 of his companions, including almost all the male descendants of the Prophet (PBUH) at the time were martyred. The Umayyad army did not even spare the Imam's six month old son, Ali al Asghar. The remainder of the caravan, mostly women and children, were forcefully marched to Damascus where Yazid and his court mocked the Imam, but were silenced by a speech given by Zainab bint Ali, the Imam's sister; among other things, she affirmed that her kin were martyrs in Paradise and vowed that Yazid and his supporters would face justice on the Day of Resurrection. In response, Yazid imprisoned the Ahlul Bayt, the family of the Prophet (PBUH), but was forced to release them when ordinary people started crowding the prison to learn about the events of Karbala.
The events of Karbala were not only some of the most tragic in the history of Islam, but also acted as a catalyst for many others. Imam Hussain's sacrifice and martyrdom inspired many anti-Yazid people to rise in revolt and although the Umayyads crushed them, they would soon be toppled by the Abbasids, who capitalized on the anger among the populace over the treatment of the Ahlul Bayt. More importantly, this brought about a schism in Islam that split it into two. Overnight, the Shia went from being a politically oriented group to a separate religious sect that laid emphasis on devotion to the Ahlul Bayt and the Imams. The Abbasids did not prove to be any better however; while most Muslims were against the slaughter of the Ahlul Bayt, the Abbasids were suspicious that the Imams would seek to press their claim to the Caliphate and thus, encouraged persecution of the Shia. All of the Imams in the Abbasid period, starting from Imam Jafar al Sadiq till Imam Askari, were poisoned at the instigation of the Abbasid Caliphs. However, the Shias began to spread slowly, centered around Iraq and spreading outwards, and received a boost from the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate by the Mongols, which ended state repression. Till the 16th century, many of the Shias in the Middle East belonged to non-Twelver denominations like Ismailis, Bektashis etc. The establishment of the Safavid Empire in Iran changed that. The Safavids imported Shia scholars from the Middle East, provided support for Shia proselytizing and religious works, and heavily persecuted Sunnis; as a result, a majority Sunni land was quickly, if violently, converted to mostly Twelver Shia belief within a few generations. Due to the power of the Safavids at their height, the neighboring, majority-Sunni Ottoman Empire viewed the Shia in its own lands with suspicion and continued the Abbasid practice of Shia persecution, as did the Mughal Empire in South Asia to a smaller extent. [1] [2]
In the 20th century, Sunni-Shia relations improved due to national struggles and joint pan-Muslim causes such as the Khilafat Movement in South Asia to save the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s and the anti-Zionist struggle against Israel which united many Muslims across the world against a common enemy. However, this progress stalled and in fact, started taking steps backwards due to the spread of Wahhabism and Salafism. Prior to the 1970s, these austere ideologies were primarily confined to the Arabian Peninsula, making up a tiny fraction of Sunni Muslims. However, new-found oil wealth allowed the Gulf States, primarily Saudi Arabia, to pour petrodollars into Wahhabi literature, mosques, madrassas and aid programs, especially in South Asia and the West. This caused the two inter-linked movements to grow rapidly, contributing to the increasing conservatism of many Muslim and Arab societies in comparison to the 60s and 70s. The rise of these movements contributed to deteriorating inter-sect relations as they do not believe in the concept of shrines, which on the other hand are a staple of Shia religious thinking. Also, these movements are far more liberal in the application of takfir or excommunication than mainstream Sunnis and have often labeled Shias to be murtad (apostates), often worse than non-Muslims. Interestingly, many Salafists in the West are new converts rather than already Muslim and most of the Muslims involved in terror acts there are self-taught and generally religiously illiterate.[3]
The Gulf nations were generous patrons of Wahhabism for two main reasons: Firstly, it enabled the Gulf regimes to move firebrand or troublesome clerics out of their countries and into others, allowing them to rule more freely with a more subservient clergy. Secondly, the Islamic Revolution in Iran shook the Middle East, showing that even the most powerful of the monarchs in the region could be toppled. Terrified of this being repeated in their countries and suspicious of their own Shia populations, the Gulf rulers found it convenient to paint the Shias as the enemy and use the spectre of the Persian Safavids coming to violently spread Shia ideology in a way to drum up support and divert their populations from thinking too deeply about the illegitimacy of kingdoms in Islam and stifling restrictions at home. As a result, inter-sect harmony has deteriorated in virtually every country around the world, though current relations vary: for instance, in the Persian Gulf region and the Levant, there are tensions between the communities and even open war as in Syria, where Sunni rebels fight a generally Shia-backed government. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, the rise of extremist groups such as the Taliban,Sipah e Sahaba and Lashkar e Jhangvi have resulted in the targeting of Shia intellectuals, mourning processions in Muharram, and imambargahs/mosques. However, support for such attacks is confined to a minority and the majority of Sunnis and Shias in South Asia continue to coexist in relative harmony. [4]
Some may continue to wonder why rivalries in this region are so deeply rooted in religion and events that occurred centuries ago. To understand that, we must look at the concept of the Ummah. In Islam, all followers of the religion are declared to be one nation, in other words deconstructing national and racial boundaries in favor of a more inclusive system where race and origin do not matter, at least in theory.[5] Since the Muslim conquest of the Middle East took place so rapidly, and subsequent conquests and proselytizing engaged a diverse range of geographically separated peoples, the only common identity with which to bind empires and nation-states together was the concept of Islamic brotherhood. Thus, religion has always been the tool of choice with which rulers have enforced their will upon the region and have also been toppled. With the Shia, a further incentive for cohesion is their status as a minority; Of the 1.5 billion Muslims worldwide, only 200 million or 15% are estimated to be Shias. [6]
To sum up, the Shia-Sunni relationship is less a victim of theological differences and more that of political games and power hungry leaders on both sides. In the end, it is not that Muslims or savages or Islam is dangerous, but that the Middle East and Muslims are victims, earlier of colonialist mindsets among foreign powers and now, of their own ignorance and narrow-mindedness. Most members of each group do live in harmony with each other across the world and where they don't, one can hope that technology and open minds can achieve that soon.
Sources:
1 http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-h ... _infoguide
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%8 ... _relations
3 http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk ... nd-alone-0
4 http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview. ... wahhabism/
5 http://eng.dar-alifta.org/foreign/ViewA ... tegoryID=3
6 http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapp ... opulation/
Salafi Jihadism: Part One
ΚΡΥΦΟ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ: ΕΜΦΑΝΙΣΗ
This is the first of a two-part post on Salafi jihadism. Part 1 is intended to provide a definition of jihad, a look at the history of Salafism/Wahhabism, their similarities and differences and how they spread in the end of the 20th century. Feel free to point out any mistakes and inaccuracies. Also if you believe I've missed something you think should have been explained or added, tell me and I'll add it to the start of the next part. Also before anyone thinks I'm targeting Salafis for an agenda, I intend to cover jihadism in each segment of Islam. I simply chose to begin with Salafi jihadism due to its greater relevance and attention in the world today.
Definition of Jihad: The Arabic word Jihad is derived from the verb Jahada - meaning to strive or struggle. In Islamic terminology it means to make an effort, to endeavor and to strive for a noble cause. The word is generally used to describe any type of striving in the cause of Allah (God). According to Islamic teachings there are three main types of Jihad as explained below:
i) Jihad-e-Akbar, i.e jihad of the highest order. This is the jihad (struggle) for self-reformation. The struggle is against our own temptations such as greed, lust and other worldly temptations. This type of jihad is obligatory on every Muslim throughout his life.
ii) Jihad-e-Kabir, i.e major jihad. This is the jihad of propagation of the truth, the message of Qur’an. The Qur’an also instructs us to spread this message with wisdom, tolerance and respect to others and their beliefs, and prohibits the use of any coercion or force. According to the Qur’an anyone who devotes his time, effort, wealth or knowledge to the cause of righteousness is practising Jihad-e-Kabir. This is also obligatory on all Muslims.
iii) Jihad-e-Asghar, i.e jihad of the lower order. This is the jihad of a defensive battle. The Qur’an has clearly restricted this type of jihad to certain conditions while forbidding transgression of any sort. The conflict must of a defensive nature for the Muslim community, Muslims must have been prevented from freely practicing their religion and beliefs, and they must have been driven from their homes. Another requirement for the declaration of this type of jihad is the existence of an Islamic State and a Muslim leader to declare it; without this condition, Muslims are allowed to defend themselves in case of being attacked or persecuted, but not to declare and prosecute an official jihad, Once a jihad has been declared, the Muslim army is bound by a set of regulations to observe while on campaign, some of which are listed here.[1][2]
It is critical to understand that the aim of jihad is not the conversion of non-Muslim populations. Most scholars agree upon the concept of jihad being a defensive measure; some modern Islamic revivalists such as Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam argued for the use of jihad as an offensive measure but for the expansion of Muslim territory and Islamic ideals rather than the religious conversion of the local peoples, forced or otherwise, to Islam. As a result, jihad is similar to the Christian concept of a crusade, but differ in this critical matter among others. However, jihad is a hotly debated topic in jurisprudence and a look at the opinions of various scholars can be found here.[3]
History of Salafism/Wahhabism: Salafism is a conservative, orthodox movement within Sunni Islam that seeks to return the practice of Islam to its fundamentals. As such, it emphasizes emulation of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the Salaf as Saliheen (Pious Predecessors) which comprise the first three generations of Muslims (Companions, Successors and Successors of the Successors) and it rejects any rituals or beliefs not practiced by them; as a result, they are against any innovations, or bidah. In legal jurisprudence, Salafis are divided among those that remain faithful to the four Sunni maddhabs (schools of law) and those that reject them in favour of ijtihad (independent legal judgement). In terms of politics, Salafis are generally divided into three categories. The largest category consists of the quietists, those who believe in remaining indifferent to politics and repression in favour of being closer to God. The next largest category is the activists, that comprises those who participate in politics to advocate for Islamist agendas and religious legislation. The smallest category by far is the jihadists, which are most well-known worldwide but are a tiny minority.
The central tenets of Salafism have existed since the earlier days of Islam, with scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah referring to and emphasizing adherence to the model of the Salaf. However, Salafism did not spread widely until the 18th century,when Muhammad Abdul Wahab started preaching in the Najd area of Arabia. Abdul Wahab believed that the practices of the society around him, including venerating the tombs of the Companions, or making invocations to holy men, were similar to the practices during the pre-Islamic Jahiliya (Age of Ignorance).Thus. he wished to return to a more puritan and conservative form of Islam, free of any supposed innovations or bidah, and similar to how he believed Islam was practiced in its earliest days. He also believed that those who professed themselves to be Muslim, but participated in bidah were beyond the pale of Islam. He began preaching in the town of Unayna, but his actions and ideals were unpopular with the nobility of the era, with Abdul Wahab being expelled from his town due to pressure applied by a powerful chief, Sulaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Ghurayr.
However, he managed to find refuge with the ruler of the town of Diriyah, Muhammad ibn Saud. In 1744, they formed a pact whereby ibn Saud would protect and propagate the doctrines espoused by Abdul Wahhab by military action, while the latter would religiously legitimize the former's military conquests and allow the imposition of Islamic taxation. which would net the Al Sauds more income than at the current rates. Hence began a period of conquest over multiple generations that expanded the Al Sauds' holdings to much of Arabia, created the First Saudi State and the propagation of Abdul Wahhab's teachings, pejoratively termed Wahhabism by its critics, outside of Najd. This is also where Abdul Wahhab broke with traditional Salafist thinking; unlike traditional Salafists, Abdul Wahhab was willing to use force and coercion to spread his teachings and was willing to participate in politics and political agreements to achieve that goal. Scholars are disputed over the degree of brutality sanctioned by Abdul Wahhab but it is clear that in successive generations, the Wahhabis become more and more radical, ultimately adopting ibn Taymiyyah's ideas of takfir (excommunication); this allowed them to brand Muslims living in violation of Islamic law to be non-Muslims and thus, justified their fighting against other Muslims. They also adopted a 'convert or die' approach to their enemies.
This increasing ruthlessness was the cause of the Al Saud's downfall. In 1802, the Wahhabis attacked Karbala, slaughtering much of the population and desecrating the shrine of Imam Hussain, and launched a similar assault on Taif in 1803, slaughtering the male population and enslaving women and children. Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire, which controlled Arabia at the time, had enough and dispatched an army in 1818 that destroyed the First Saudi State, killing the Al Saud ruler, razing Diriyah and doing their best to stamp out both the House of Saud and the Wahhabi movement. However, the remoteness of the Najd prevented either from happening and a Second Saudi State resulted in that region; consequently, by the end of the 19th century, most of the townspeople in the area were Wahhabis. Many of the new members were former Bedouins that abandoned nomadic life for settlements on the insistence of Wahhabi religious scholars who declared that a nomadic lifestyle was incompatible with Islam. The newly settled Bedouins served well as soldiers for the Wahhabi religious leaders.
Although alive, Wahhabism remained mostly confined to the Najd till the end of the First World War. During the war, the reigning head of the Al Saud family, Abdulaziz ibn Saud, aided the Allies by revolting against the Ottomans. Although his campaign to rule Arabia had begun in 1901, he was unable to assert his authority over Hijaz until 1923, when the British removed their support for the Sharifs of Makkah. In 1927, Abdulaziz signed a treaty with the British, who recognized his independence from the former Ottoman territories in exchange for letting go of Transjordan, Iraq, Kuwait and other British protectorates. However, Abdulaziz faced an internal rebellion among his troops. During his campaigns, he made use of the Ikhwan, a militia of radical Wahhabi Bedouin warriors. When he signed the treaty with the British, the Ikhwan refused to obey and raided Transjordan. Unwilling to risk British ire, Abdulaziz fought the Ikhwan and defeated them in 1929 with British support. The survivors of the Ikhwan were then organized in various militias which would later form the core of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Although defeated, the Ikhwan left their mark on Arabian society by uprooting the old cultural norms and supplanting them with radical Wahhabi ideology as part of their campaign on behalf of the Al Sauds, In addition, Wahhabi ideology spread to the cities of Makkah and Madinah and gained control of the religious apparatus in the land. Although the Wahhabi religious establishment, was given much latitude with respect to religious obervance and teaching, in many cases Abdulaziz overruled the ulema, allowing the driving of automobiles anf the attendance of Shia pilgrims at the annual Hajj. In addition, most of Abdulaziz's consolidation of power and dealings with Western powers kept him at odds with the ulema.
Although Salafism/Wahhabism inspired offshoots such as the Ahl-e-Hadith and Deoband movements in South Asia, the reach of these two ideologies was quite low during most of the 20th century. Even within Saudi Arabia, the implementation of Islamic law was relatively relaxed compared to today. This changed in 1979, when two things happened: firstly, the Iranian Revolution occurred, toppling the Shah there and sending shockwaves through the monarchies in the region. Secondly, the Grand Mosque in Makkah was taken over by Islamic extremists who called for the stricter implementation of Islamic doctrines and the fall of the Al Saud family. In the aftermath of these events, the Saudi government became stricter in religious matters. Due to the huge increase in oil income since the 1973 oil crisis, the government had lavished funding on religious literature, scholarships and hundreds of new Islamic schools, universities and mosques. In order to counter any threat of an Iranian-style revolution by the Shia population of the country, and to satisfy disgruntled conservative clerics, this funding was further increased. The beginning of the Afghan War provided an opportunity to export troublesome clerics to Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries. This achieved two aims; one, it allowed the Sauds to embed a Wahhabi religious establishment of their choice and secondly, the export of Wahhabi ideology served as a bulwark against the revolutionary doctrines that Iran was beginning to propagate in the Middle East. Since the Afghan War attracted volunteers from all over the Muslim world, almost all of whom spent time in the Saudi-sponsored religious schools, the spread of Salafism was assured.[4]
Due to the financial support that Salafism/Wahhabism enjoys from the Gulf, it has received attention and commands influence disproportionate to its size. There are roughly 50 million Salafists in the world, a tiny fraction of the total Muslim population.[5] Yet, Salafi scholars such as Zakir Naik from India are some of the most recognizable in the Muslim world, having instant name recognition even amongst many non-Salafis. The Salafi movement is described as the fastest growing Islamic movement in the world, according to a report by the BND, the German domestic intelligence service.[6] This is especially true for regions such as Europe and North America, which have no native Islamic traditions of their own and thus are more susceptible to supplanting than historically Muslim areas. Although Salafis have historically been peaceful and apolitical, believing in using persuasion rather than force, the modern Salafism is often considered indistinguishable from Wahhabism and in many cases, conflict has arisen when Salafis have tried to propagate their doctrines. For instance in Pakistan, there is much animosity between followers of the Deoband movement, inspired by Salafism, and the Barelvi movement, inspired by the Sufi traditions of the subcontinent. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring more and more Salafists are becoming part of the activist category, joining politics to propagate their beliefs. One example of such a movement is the Nour Party in Egypt, which gained a quarter of the seats in the 2011-12 elections. In normal circumstances, one might consider the engagement of conservative Islamists in democratic politics to be a positive sign; however, the failure of the Arab Spring to bring meaningful change to the lives of people in most of the affected countries has disillusioned many democratic Salafis, many of whom have shifted to the jihadist category of Salafism, thinking military action to be the last feasible route.[7]
Sources:
1 http://islamicfaq.org/jihad/
2 http://www.islamhelpline.net/node/441
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jihad#Current_usage
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabism
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafi_mo ... e_note-123
6 http://www.aina.org/news/20120416150547.htm
7 http://www.economist.com/news/middle-ea ... d-it-beats
Definition of Jihad: The Arabic word Jihad is derived from the verb Jahada - meaning to strive or struggle. In Islamic terminology it means to make an effort, to endeavor and to strive for a noble cause. The word is generally used to describe any type of striving in the cause of Allah (God). According to Islamic teachings there are three main types of Jihad as explained below:
i) Jihad-e-Akbar, i.e jihad of the highest order. This is the jihad (struggle) for self-reformation. The struggle is against our own temptations such as greed, lust and other worldly temptations. This type of jihad is obligatory on every Muslim throughout his life.
ii) Jihad-e-Kabir, i.e major jihad. This is the jihad of propagation of the truth, the message of Qur’an. The Qur’an also instructs us to spread this message with wisdom, tolerance and respect to others and their beliefs, and prohibits the use of any coercion or force. According to the Qur’an anyone who devotes his time, effort, wealth or knowledge to the cause of righteousness is practising Jihad-e-Kabir. This is also obligatory on all Muslims.
iii) Jihad-e-Asghar, i.e jihad of the lower order. This is the jihad of a defensive battle. The Qur’an has clearly restricted this type of jihad to certain conditions while forbidding transgression of any sort. The conflict must of a defensive nature for the Muslim community, Muslims must have been prevented from freely practicing their religion and beliefs, and they must have been driven from their homes. Another requirement for the declaration of this type of jihad is the existence of an Islamic State and a Muslim leader to declare it; without this condition, Muslims are allowed to defend themselves in case of being attacked or persecuted, but not to declare and prosecute an official jihad, Once a jihad has been declared, the Muslim army is bound by a set of regulations to observe while on campaign, some of which are listed here.[1][2]
It is critical to understand that the aim of jihad is not the conversion of non-Muslim populations. Most scholars agree upon the concept of jihad being a defensive measure; some modern Islamic revivalists such as Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam argued for the use of jihad as an offensive measure but for the expansion of Muslim territory and Islamic ideals rather than the religious conversion of the local peoples, forced or otherwise, to Islam. As a result, jihad is similar to the Christian concept of a crusade, but differ in this critical matter among others. However, jihad is a hotly debated topic in jurisprudence and a look at the opinions of various scholars can be found here.[3]
History of Salafism/Wahhabism: Salafism is a conservative, orthodox movement within Sunni Islam that seeks to return the practice of Islam to its fundamentals. As such, it emphasizes emulation of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the Salaf as Saliheen (Pious Predecessors) which comprise the first three generations of Muslims (Companions, Successors and Successors of the Successors) and it rejects any rituals or beliefs not practiced by them; as a result, they are against any innovations, or bidah. In legal jurisprudence, Salafis are divided among those that remain faithful to the four Sunni maddhabs (schools of law) and those that reject them in favour of ijtihad (independent legal judgement). In terms of politics, Salafis are generally divided into three categories. The largest category consists of the quietists, those who believe in remaining indifferent to politics and repression in favour of being closer to God. The next largest category is the activists, that comprises those who participate in politics to advocate for Islamist agendas and religious legislation. The smallest category by far is the jihadists, which are most well-known worldwide but are a tiny minority.
The central tenets of Salafism have existed since the earlier days of Islam, with scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah referring to and emphasizing adherence to the model of the Salaf. However, Salafism did not spread widely until the 18th century,when Muhammad Abdul Wahab started preaching in the Najd area of Arabia. Abdul Wahab believed that the practices of the society around him, including venerating the tombs of the Companions, or making invocations to holy men, were similar to the practices during the pre-Islamic Jahiliya (Age of Ignorance).Thus. he wished to return to a more puritan and conservative form of Islam, free of any supposed innovations or bidah, and similar to how he believed Islam was practiced in its earliest days. He also believed that those who professed themselves to be Muslim, but participated in bidah were beyond the pale of Islam. He began preaching in the town of Unayna, but his actions and ideals were unpopular with the nobility of the era, with Abdul Wahab being expelled from his town due to pressure applied by a powerful chief, Sulaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Ghurayr.
However, he managed to find refuge with the ruler of the town of Diriyah, Muhammad ibn Saud. In 1744, they formed a pact whereby ibn Saud would protect and propagate the doctrines espoused by Abdul Wahhab by military action, while the latter would religiously legitimize the former's military conquests and allow the imposition of Islamic taxation. which would net the Al Sauds more income than at the current rates. Hence began a period of conquest over multiple generations that expanded the Al Sauds' holdings to much of Arabia, created the First Saudi State and the propagation of Abdul Wahhab's teachings, pejoratively termed Wahhabism by its critics, outside of Najd. This is also where Abdul Wahhab broke with traditional Salafist thinking; unlike traditional Salafists, Abdul Wahhab was willing to use force and coercion to spread his teachings and was willing to participate in politics and political agreements to achieve that goal. Scholars are disputed over the degree of brutality sanctioned by Abdul Wahhab but it is clear that in successive generations, the Wahhabis become more and more radical, ultimately adopting ibn Taymiyyah's ideas of takfir (excommunication); this allowed them to brand Muslims living in violation of Islamic law to be non-Muslims and thus, justified their fighting against other Muslims. They also adopted a 'convert or die' approach to their enemies.
This increasing ruthlessness was the cause of the Al Saud's downfall. In 1802, the Wahhabis attacked Karbala, slaughtering much of the population and desecrating the shrine of Imam Hussain, and launched a similar assault on Taif in 1803, slaughtering the male population and enslaving women and children. Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire, which controlled Arabia at the time, had enough and dispatched an army in 1818 that destroyed the First Saudi State, killing the Al Saud ruler, razing Diriyah and doing their best to stamp out both the House of Saud and the Wahhabi movement. However, the remoteness of the Najd prevented either from happening and a Second Saudi State resulted in that region; consequently, by the end of the 19th century, most of the townspeople in the area were Wahhabis. Many of the new members were former Bedouins that abandoned nomadic life for settlements on the insistence of Wahhabi religious scholars who declared that a nomadic lifestyle was incompatible with Islam. The newly settled Bedouins served well as soldiers for the Wahhabi religious leaders.
Although alive, Wahhabism remained mostly confined to the Najd till the end of the First World War. During the war, the reigning head of the Al Saud family, Abdulaziz ibn Saud, aided the Allies by revolting against the Ottomans. Although his campaign to rule Arabia had begun in 1901, he was unable to assert his authority over Hijaz until 1923, when the British removed their support for the Sharifs of Makkah. In 1927, Abdulaziz signed a treaty with the British, who recognized his independence from the former Ottoman territories in exchange for letting go of Transjordan, Iraq, Kuwait and other British protectorates. However, Abdulaziz faced an internal rebellion among his troops. During his campaigns, he made use of the Ikhwan, a militia of radical Wahhabi Bedouin warriors. When he signed the treaty with the British, the Ikhwan refused to obey and raided Transjordan. Unwilling to risk British ire, Abdulaziz fought the Ikhwan and defeated them in 1929 with British support. The survivors of the Ikhwan were then organized in various militias which would later form the core of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Although defeated, the Ikhwan left their mark on Arabian society by uprooting the old cultural norms and supplanting them with radical Wahhabi ideology as part of their campaign on behalf of the Al Sauds, In addition, Wahhabi ideology spread to the cities of Makkah and Madinah and gained control of the religious apparatus in the land. Although the Wahhabi religious establishment, was given much latitude with respect to religious obervance and teaching, in many cases Abdulaziz overruled the ulema, allowing the driving of automobiles anf the attendance of Shia pilgrims at the annual Hajj. In addition, most of Abdulaziz's consolidation of power and dealings with Western powers kept him at odds with the ulema.
Although Salafism/Wahhabism inspired offshoots such as the Ahl-e-Hadith and Deoband movements in South Asia, the reach of these two ideologies was quite low during most of the 20th century. Even within Saudi Arabia, the implementation of Islamic law was relatively relaxed compared to today. This changed in 1979, when two things happened: firstly, the Iranian Revolution occurred, toppling the Shah there and sending shockwaves through the monarchies in the region. Secondly, the Grand Mosque in Makkah was taken over by Islamic extremists who called for the stricter implementation of Islamic doctrines and the fall of the Al Saud family. In the aftermath of these events, the Saudi government became stricter in religious matters. Due to the huge increase in oil income since the 1973 oil crisis, the government had lavished funding on religious literature, scholarships and hundreds of new Islamic schools, universities and mosques. In order to counter any threat of an Iranian-style revolution by the Shia population of the country, and to satisfy disgruntled conservative clerics, this funding was further increased. The beginning of the Afghan War provided an opportunity to export troublesome clerics to Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries. This achieved two aims; one, it allowed the Sauds to embed a Wahhabi religious establishment of their choice and secondly, the export of Wahhabi ideology served as a bulwark against the revolutionary doctrines that Iran was beginning to propagate in the Middle East. Since the Afghan War attracted volunteers from all over the Muslim world, almost all of whom spent time in the Saudi-sponsored religious schools, the spread of Salafism was assured.[4]
Due to the financial support that Salafism/Wahhabism enjoys from the Gulf, it has received attention and commands influence disproportionate to its size. There are roughly 50 million Salafists in the world, a tiny fraction of the total Muslim population.[5] Yet, Salafi scholars such as Zakir Naik from India are some of the most recognizable in the Muslim world, having instant name recognition even amongst many non-Salafis. The Salafi movement is described as the fastest growing Islamic movement in the world, according to a report by the BND, the German domestic intelligence service.[6] This is especially true for regions such as Europe and North America, which have no native Islamic traditions of their own and thus are more susceptible to supplanting than historically Muslim areas. Although Salafis have historically been peaceful and apolitical, believing in using persuasion rather than force, the modern Salafism is often considered indistinguishable from Wahhabism and in many cases, conflict has arisen when Salafis have tried to propagate their doctrines. For instance in Pakistan, there is much animosity between followers of the Deoband movement, inspired by Salafism, and the Barelvi movement, inspired by the Sufi traditions of the subcontinent. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring more and more Salafists are becoming part of the activist category, joining politics to propagate their beliefs. One example of such a movement is the Nour Party in Egypt, which gained a quarter of the seats in the 2011-12 elections. In normal circumstances, one might consider the engagement of conservative Islamists in democratic politics to be a positive sign; however, the failure of the Arab Spring to bring meaningful change to the lives of people in most of the affected countries has disillusioned many democratic Salafis, many of whom have shifted to the jihadist category of Salafism, thinking military action to be the last feasible route.[7]
Sources:
1 http://islamicfaq.org/jihad/
2 http://www.islamhelpline.net/node/441
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jihad#Current_usage
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabism
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafi_mo ... e_note-123
6 http://www.aina.org/news/20120416150547.htm
7 http://www.economist.com/news/middle-ea ... d-it-beats
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