Περα βρεχει η Ελλαδα

[Προέλλην]

Που ζεις Όργι;
Στην ελληνική βιομηχανία 1400 παίρνουν πλέον οι Δντές. Ο κόσμος δουλεύει τζάμπα υπερωρίες και τζάμπα Σάββατα.
Βλέπεις να να συντελείται κανένα βιομηχανικό θαύμα;

Το ότι η Ελλάδα δεν έχει βιομηχανία εφάμιλη της Τουρκίας γιατί είναι υψηλοί οι μισθοί, αποτελεί ανέκδοτο.

Οι βιομηχανίες δεν γίνονται μόνο βουλησιαρχικά, αλλά πρέπει να συντρέχουν και άλλες προϋποθέσεις.

Kαλα περιμενε συ με 5 χρονια ψιλοακριβων βιομ. Μισθων με πανισχυρα σωματεια, με αρνηση πολιτικα και κοινωνικα σε επενδυσεις να γινει κατι.
40 χρονια οι προκομενες χωρες ειχαν χαμηλα μεροκαματα εστηναν κωλο σε ξενες βιομηχανικες επενδυσεις και ακουγαν προσεχτικα το δντ ωστε σημερα ναχουν σημερα ισχυρη βιομηχανια.
Χριστιανομαρξικα γατακια.

Για πες μερικές.

H Toυρκία πάντως μόλις τα τελευταία χρόνια θέριεψε, τόσα χρόνια μόνο τα χαμηλά μεροκάματα δεν έκλασαν.

[Προέλλην]

Πληρης αποβιομηχανιση λογω επαναστατικης γυμναστικης απο το 1981 αλλα φταιει ο καπιταλισμος.

Η ζώνη του λυκόφωτος. Το άνοιγμα των αγορών φταίει.

Οι τουρκοι δεν ειχαν ποτε πριν πασοκ στην εξουσια.
Τα τελευταια 6-7 χρονια μαλλον εχουν πασοκ και δεν τους βλεπω καλα.

Λολ. Πασοκάρα είχαν επι 10ετίες. Οι Κεμαλιστές οικονομικά ήταν τέρμα κρατιστές.
Αντίθετα, οι Ισλαμιστές είναι οι φιλελεύθεροι οικονομικά.

Έλα τώρα, πες, δεν έχεις ιδέα το τι γίνεται στην Τουρκία.

[Προέλλην]

Να ξαναβάλουμε το νήμα με τις απεργίες σε Ν. Κορέα;

Έλεος πια κατσικόβλαχοι.

[Προέλλην]

Για να καταλάβετε τι φιδέμπορας είναι ο Όργι:

gdp.png

[Προέλλην]

ÖZDEMİR BAYRAKTAR

He graduated from Istanbul Technical University, Department of Mechanical Engineering in 1972. After graduation, he worked as the research assistant of İsmail Hakkı Öz, Professor of the Department of Engines for two years, and completed his master's degree in internal combustion engines.

He assumed the leading role in many factories in the industrial sector (Burdur Tractors, Istanbul Segment Uzel etc.) organization, and has worked on new investments in the technical stage manager duties. In 1984, he took part in the establishment of Baykar Makina in order to contribute to the localization works for the automotive sector.

He has directed many unique machine design and manufacturing and machining apparatus design processes for the precision machining sector. Due to his interest in aviation, he has a private pilot certificate. Özdemir Bayraktar, who played a pioneering and ideal role in Baykar's development of National and Original Unmanned Aerial Vehicle technology, actively took part in the implementation of these projects from the design stage to the prototype stage, from the manufacturing stage to the investment planning.

Selçuk Bayraktar was born in 1980 in Sarıyer, Istanbul as the middle child. Originally from Trabzon. His brothers Haluk Bayraktar and Ahmet Bayraktar. His father, Özdemir Bayraktar, is the owner of Baykar Makine. Özdemir Bayraktar, who was a political father in the 1990s, met Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in those years.

training

Selçuk Bayraktar, graduated from Robert College in 1997 and continued his undergraduate education in ITU Electronics and Communication Engineering Department. During her studies, she received an internship from the GRASP laboratory of the University of Pennsylvania. He continued his graduate studies in Upenn between 2002-2004 with the scholarship offer he received. He received his master's degree on unmanned aircraft at the University of Pennsylvania and his PhD in robotics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

He conducted studies on formation flight experiments of UAVs, coordination of air-ground robot teams, flight control and guidance systems.

After completing his graduate studies, he received a scholarship from MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) for his outstanding achievements during his studies. During his doctoral studies, he carried out studies on automatic flight control algorithms that would give Unmanned Helicopter Systems the ability to perform aggressive maneuvering.

He has been working as Technical Manager (CTO) at Baykar Makina since 2007. Aviation system architecture, flight control, development of navigation algorithms, system kinematics and dynamics, electronic hardware and embedded software development etc. of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems, developed as National and Original within Baykar. issues.

Bayraktar, a Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, fired the missile developed by Roketsan on 17 December 2015 and hit the targets with 100% accuracy in the firing test loaded with 2 Roketsan MAM-L guided missiles.

Selçuk Bayraktar has been working as Technical Manager (CTO) at Baykar Makina since 2007. Aviation system architecture, flight control, development of navigation algorithms, system kinematics and dynamics, electronic hardware and embedded software development etc. of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems, developed as National and Original within Baykar. issues.

Bayraktar, who married Sümeyye Erdoğan, the daughter of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on Saturday, May 14, 2016, has one daughter.

Βρείτε επιχειρηματίες στην Ελλάδα με τέτοιο προφίλ.

[Προέλλην]

Όταν λέμε πέρα βρέχει, εννοούμε πέρα βρέχει

Turkey: 186-day strike at Mayr-Melnhof ends in victory for workers

http://www.industriall-union.org/turkey ... -workers-0

Workers go on strike in Renault’s Turkey factory, production stops

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/worker ... tops-82465

Αs the strike at Turkey's two largest automotive factories, Renault and Tofaş (Turkish Automotive Plants) - located in the northern province of Bursa - continued into its sixth day, more plants from the automotive sector have joined the strike.

https://www.dailysabah.com/automotive/2 ... on-6th-day

Factory production hit by metal workers strike in Turkey

https://www.euronews.com/2015/01/29/fac ... -in-turkey

Strike hits production at world's biggest Nutella factory

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/ ... la-factory

Strike in Bialetti Factory in Turkey

http://www.birlesikmetalis.org/index.ph ... m-bialetti

Workers strike at Nestlé factory, Turkey

http://www.iuf.org/w/?q=node/5047

Workers at Turkish Saint-Gobain subsidiary strike for a fair contract

http://www.industriall-union.org/worker ... r-contract

AROUND 250 members of Turkey’s IndustriALL trade union affiliate Selüloz-Is have won an outstanding victory after being out on strike for six months.

Selüloz-Is members had been on strike since 20th June – after negotiations on a new collective agreement failed as management proposed a zero per cent wage increase! Under this new three-year agreement workers will get wage increases of 280 Turkish Liras (US$53) per month for 2018. In the second and third year of the agreement they will be entitled to 300 Liras (US$57) per month for the first six months of 2019, plus the inflation rate for the second half of 2019 and the whole of 2020.

https://wrp.org.uk/features/turkish-wor ... th-strike/

A ρε φίδεμπορες.

Το κακό είναι ότι μαζί παραμυθιάζουν και τον εαυτό τους, γι αυτό είναι και επικίνδυνοι για την κοινωνία.

[Λαχουρένιος]

Kαλα περιμενε συ με 5 χρονια ψιλοακριβων βιομ. Μισθων με πανισχυρα σωματεια, με αρνηση πολιτικα και κοινωνικα σε επενδυσεις να γινει κατι.
40 χρονια οι προκομενες χωρες ειχαν χαμηλα μεροκαματα εστηναν κωλο σε ξενες βιομηχανικες επενδυσεις και ακουγαν προσεχτικα το δντ ωστε σημερα ναχουν σημερα ισχυρη βιομηχανια.
Χριστιανομαρξικα γατακια.

Εχουμε 9 χρονια λιτοτητας και περιορισμου συνδικαλιστικων δικαιωματων. Οι τελευταιες 3-4 κυβερνησεις εφαρμοζουν θελοντας και μη φιλελευθερη οικονομικη πολιτικη και το πολιτικο συστημα εχει στραφει προς τα δεξια σε ακραιο βαθμο πχ κανεις δε θα περιμενε το 2010 οτι ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ θα εκανε τοσες ιδιωτικοποιησεις.

Βλεπεις να αλλαζει κατι προς το καλυτερο για την αναπτυξη βιομηχανιας στην Ελλαδα? Ας πουμε τωρα εχουμε και καλα φιλελε κυβερνηση Μητσοτακη. Πιστευεις πως μεχρι το 2023 θα εχουμε δει καποια αναπτυξη σε αυτο το κομματι? Σιγα.

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Ρε, μιλάμε για φίδια. Στην τριτοκοσμική Τουρκία το 75% των μηχανικών παίρνει 1380 Ευρώ το μήνα



O ανιδείκευτος σε γραμμή παραγωγής παίρνει 400 Eυρώ το μήνα.

O κατώτατος μισθός είναι 320 το μήνα

https://www.forum-expat-management.com/ ... ts-a-boost

(με απεργίες στα εργοστάσια με ισχυρά εργατικά σωματεία)


Και, αυτά με αστεία νοίκια, κόστος φαγητού, και με τα μάρκετ να είναι γεμάτα με φθηνά τούρκικα προϊόντα (καθαριστικά, είδη ατομικής φροντίδα, κλπ)


Να πάμε στην Τουρκία να φάμε ψωμάκι!

[Προέλλην]

WHY GREECE HAS NOT INDUSTRIALISED

A policy of industrialisation for the economic development of Greece has been a key tenet of the traditional left for more than half a century. After World War II, the right has also come round to assigning great importance to industrialisation, though differing from the left in wanting to promote it via incentives to private initiative.

The five year plan of the present government, while not attaching exclusive priority to any one sector, nevertheless gives emphasis to the expansion of industry. (One measure of this is the intended expansion by 500% in the share of manufacturing in national income as compared with the period 1966-80.)

The paradox of the Greek economy is that, despite the consensus about the basic importance of industrialisation, it has grown rapidly in the post-war decades – real income per head has roughly trebled since 1960 – without substantial expansion in manufacturing. According to World Bank data, the proportion of manufacturing output to national product was 16% in 1960 and had risen only to 19% in 1979.

The equivalent proportion for the industrial market economies as a whole was 27%, also for 1979. (The year 1979 is chosen to avoid the cyclical distortions of the current recession.) But this comparison flatters Greece because about 40% of those employed in so-called manufacturing are in units which employ less than ten people and more than a quarter in less than five people – not manufacturing then, but handicrafts. Another facet of low industrialisation is that only a quarter of current account imports are covered by manufactured exports, a proportion smaller than many underdeveloped countries. (And, while growth of manufactured exports as a proportion of total exports was rapid from 1960 to the early 1970s, it has slowed since.)

This coincidence of a relatively high level of economic development, as measured by income per head, and of a low level of industrialisation is explained by the peculiarity of the Greek economy which consists of having three large sources of foreign exchange – tourism, shipping and emigrants’ remittances – which cover, between them, 40 of all imports (including invisible imports) and, in so doing, maintain a high foreign exchange value of the drachma which, in turn, also makes uncompetitive Greek manufactures vis-à-vis foreign products.

If we did not have tourism, shipping and emigrants’ remittances, it is almost certain that we would have had a much bigger manufacturing sector and more industrial exports. Whether our economic prosperity at the present time would have been higher or lower no one can say, but even if it would have been higher, there is no point in shedding any tears since history cannot be rewritten.

The interesting question is whether Greece, due to its peculiarities, has now superseded the stage of extensive industrialisation and whether, therefore, a policy emphasis on industrial expansion may be counter-productive.

Wages in big urban centres in Greece are now half to two thirds of those in advanced industrial countries. This would have given us a strong competitive advantage in world markets for manufactures if we already had the necessary manufacturing capital, manufacturing infrastructure and an entrenched market position . But is it enough as a launching platform when we start almost from nothing.

Hong Cong and Singapore will continue to compete strongly in world markets even when their average wages reach two thirds of those in advanced industrial countries. But it is virtually certain that they could not have started on the path of industrialisation if initially their wages were as high as half or two thirds of the developed countries.

Equally, for Greece, some thirty years ago, when wages were less than a quarter of the advanced manufacturing countries (which were then dominated by the US), export-oriented industrialisation (necessarily export-oriented because of the small home market) was a feasible option. By offsetting the then enormous productivity gap, the low wages would have provided a potential for price competitiveness which could have overcome the disadvantage of a late start in the industrialisation race. But since then, while the productivity gap has narrowed, the wage gap has narrowed by more – thanks to the contribution of tourism, shipping and emigration – so that price competitiveness has not improved and the potential for improvement has greatly diminished.

The view that competitiveness compatible with large scale industrialisation may not be feasible any longer is reinforced by two important considerations. First most underdeveloped countries in the world also seek to industrialise and countries such as Brazil, Mexico and India, which have a better industrial infrastructure than Greece and a far bigger domestic market, are characterised by wages which range from ½ to 1/10 of Greek wages; what is more, for such countries industrialisation is essential for thei development because they are too big to be able to find substitutes to industrialisation of the sort which Greece has been able to find. Second, the advanced industrial countries are facing excess capacity in their manufacturing sector, not just as a cyclical phenomenon associated with the current recession, but a long un phenomenon due to the switch of demand towards tertiary products as standards of living increase, with the result that industrial firms in these countries fight more fiercely than ever for their share of the market and against its erosion by new competitors.

This is not to say that some industrial enterprises will not manage to flourish: in the processing of agricultural products, in the supply of some agricultural machinery and of equipment associated with ships and shipyards and, perhaps, in a small way, even in areas of new technology, opportunities for some industrial expansion which is economically and socially desirable can be found or can be created. All these areas are rightly emphasised in the current Five Year Plan. But the preceding thoughts suggest that, in total, the contribution of further industrialisation to Greek economic development will be modest.

For more than a modest industrial expansion there will be a price to pay in the form of a reduction in real wages and this price is unlikely to be acceptable to Greek workers, if they have a choice.

Of course, one can conceive a scenario in which they have no choice: a deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations can raise tensions permanently to a level that repels tourists and third world countries may claim a high share of their trade for their own ships, thus restricting the earnings of Greek shipping. In such a case one of two things will happen: either a big new wave of emigration or a big reduction in real wages which will make a big industrial expansion both feasible and desirable.

-Yiannis Spraos

[Λαχουρένιος]

Παντως ο Σπραος επιβεβαιωνει τον Οργι μεχρι ενος σημειου γιατι λεει οτι ναι μεν οι μισθοι ειναι τα 2/3 των ανεπτυγμενων χωρων, αλλα ειναι αρκετα υψηλοι για να μην υπαρξει βιομηχανοποιηση.

ΥΓ Το αρθρο ειναι του '84 αλλα παραμενει αρκετα επικαιρο