Η αποπαγκοσμιοποίηση είναι ήδη εδώ

[Προέλλην]

αλλά προφανώς δεν αρέσει στα παρανοϊκά κοπρόσκυλα τους αντιπαγκοσμιοποιητές

Αποπαγκοσμιοποίηση σημαίνει όλα πιο ακριβά απο ότι ξέρατε δεκαετίες τώρα, πλήν κάποιων ελαχίστων βασικών αγαθών που μπορούν να παραχθούν εγχωρίως.

Θα φάτε καλά.

Μας φλομωσες στις πιπες παλι ,το 1999 πήγα να παρω τηλεοραση ,πηρα μια σονυ 350 χιλ ,ντουκου τα λεφτα (τοσο ηταν το μηνιατικο μου) το αυτοκινητακι μου το πηρα 4 εκατ ,ενα φιατ τεμπρα 1600,τιποτα δεν ελειπε τα ναικ για το μπασκετ 35 40 χιλ και ηταν παπουτσια οχι σαν τα αχρηστα που φερνουν τωρα και το σουβλακι 100 δραχμες μην ξεχνιομαστε.

Το φυσούσες το παραδάκι τότε. Μόλις άνοιξαν οι αγορές όμως κατέστεις μη-ανταγωνιστικός.

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Εχετε ζεστό νερό στη Γερμανία ;

Όχι βέβαια. Ούτε νερό δεν έχει, στα ποτάμια πάμε και πλυνόμαστε.

[Perseus1966]

Μας φλομωσες στις πιπες παλι ,το 1999 πήγα να παρω τηλεοραση ,πηρα μια σονυ 350 χιλ ,ντουκου τα λεφτα (τοσο ηταν το μηνιατικο μου) το αυτοκινητακι μου το πηρα 4 εκατ ,ενα φιατ τεμπρα 1600,τιποτα δεν ελειπε τα ναικ για το μπασκετ 35 40 χιλ και ηταν παπουτσια οχι σαν τα αχρηστα που φερνουν τωρα και το σουβλακι 100 δραχμες μην ξεχνιομαστε.

Το φυσούσες το παραδάκι τότε. Μόλις άνοιξαν οι αγορές όμως κατέστεις μη-ανταγωνιστικός.

Οι αγορες ανοιξαν οπου ηθελαν αυτές για να κονομησει η γνωστη χωρα.

[Προέλλην]

Με Μητσοτάκη θα ανοίξουν παντού. Oι μη-ανταγωνιστικοί θα ξετρυπωθούν και απο τα τελευταία τους καταφύγια.

[Προέλλην]

Deglobalization and decoupling risk causing more global damage

China Daily 2022-07-15 07:24

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has rekindled the debate on economic dependency and deglobalization, something that haunted the world when previous US president Donald Trump launched trade wars against China and other US trading partners a few years ago. Like some others at the time, Trump also blamed US economic woes on other countries, from China and India to Mexico and Germany.

In recent months, the European Union has taken measures to reduce its dependency on Russian gas and oil through six rounds of harsh sanctions. But the sanctions are not working well, as Russia's current account surplus, which usually shrinks in the summer months when the EU does not need gas for heating, jumped for the first time to $28.2 billion in June. The EU is still the top buyer of Russian gas and oil.

The current debate in the EU has prompted some to ask whether the bloc has a dependency issue with China since China is the EU's largest trade partner of goods, as well as the largest trade partner of Germany, the EU's largest economy.

Such paranoia is unjustified, for China, too, depends heavily on EU countries for both technology and high-end manufactured goods, and yet Chinese leaders have never fear-mongered about the country's "dependency" on the EU.

Facts speak louder than anything else. While the EU and the US restricted exports after the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in early 2020, China has been acting in a responsible way in keeping the global supply chains open and running. Among other things, it has been a key global supplier of personal protection equipment and COVID-19 vaccines.

The iPhone, which uses technologies and components from more than 40 economies, is just one example of how interconnected the world has become. Making iPhone entirely in the United States may not be impossible but would make no economic sense, because it would raise the price of iPhone to at least $4,000 a piece.

Western multinational companies are drawn to China because of its comparative advantages, improving business climate, fast-growing middle-income group, and because it is home to a fifth of the global population. Besides, China's participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and its application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership reflect its unwavering policy of deepening reform and widening opening-up.

Not everyone is easily fooled by the false deglobalization narrative. Volkswagen CEO Herbert Diess said last month that "Germany would look completely different" if it turned away from China, and warned that such a move would harm Germany's economic growth and employment.

In fact, the few who are fear-mongering about China in Europe should be more concerned about a possible return of Trump to power in the US in 2024, for he could again declare that the EU is worse than China when it comes to trade with the US.

Douglas Irwin, a nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, argued in a June 16 analysis that globalization has enabled nearly all countries to grow richer in recent decades. In contrast to populist sentiments, Irwin defended globalization as a race to the top, saying that the vast economic gains made by least-developed countries over the past few decades have not come at the expense of advanced economies.

Many economists say many of the US' problems can be attributed to a lack of training programs for laid-off workers, programs that are available in many other countries.

Shang-Jin Wei, former chief economist at the Asian Development Bank, and Tao Wang, chief China economist and head of Asia economic research at the UBS Investment Bank, have argued in a Project Syndicate article on Wednesday that globalization made it easier for major central banks to pursue and maintain low inflation but deglobalization risks having the opposite effect.

Wednesday was also the day when the US announced that inflation in June hit 9.1 percent, the highest in four decades.

True, we should address the problems associated with globalization, but continued globalization, instead of deglobalization or decoupling, is a far better way to tackle global challenges, boost global growth and ensure world peace.

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202207/ ... 6c6d8.html

China Daily (simplified Chinese: 中国日报; traditional Chinese: 中國日報; pinyin: Zhōngguó Rìbào) is an English-language daily newspaper owned by the Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party

Έχουν κλάσει μαλλί οι Κινέζοι.

Μετά απ όσα έγιναν, είναι αναπόφευκτο ότι σημαντικό τμήμα της Δυτικής παραγωγής θα επαναπατριστεί, όχι απαραίτητα σε στενά εθνικά πλαίσια, αλλά σε δυτικά. Π.χ. η Ελλάδα ίσως και να ωφεληθεί απο βαρβάτες επενδύσεις, καθώς το εργατικό της κόστος είναι σημαντικά χαμηλότερο απ ότι οι καθεαυτού δυτικές χώρες.

Φυσικά, ακόμη κι έτσι, τα κόστη δεν συγκρίνονται με το να παράγεις στον 3ο κόσμο. Έτσι, έπειτα απο μια σχετικά μακρόσυρτη κούρσα πληθωρισμού, οι τιμές θα σταθεροποιηθούν σε υψηλά επίπεδα συγκριτικά με τα τις προηγούμενες λίγες δεκαετίες του ξέφρενου παγκοσμιοποιητικού πάρτι. Αυτό δεν είναι απαραίτητα κακό, καθώς αρκετά προϊόντα θα σχεδιάζονται να κρατούν περισσότερο και να μπορούν να ενσωματώνουν αναβαθμίσεις, με ένα πιο βιώσιμο μοντέλο δηλαδή.

Εν τω μεταξύ, όλες οι κοπριές που τόσα χρόνια το έπαιζαν αντιπαγκοσμιοποιητές, χωρίς καν να καταλαβαίνουν τι σημαίνει πρακτικά αυτό, απο δω και πέρα θα σκούζουν μέχρι τελικής πτώσης για την αύξηση των τιμών, και θα παρακαλάνε να ξανανοίξουν οι αγορές, οι μετακινήσεις κεφαλαίων και ανθρώπων.

[Προέλλην]

Goodbye China, Hello Deglobalization – Shipping Woes Push USA Factory Boom

American executives are working to deglobalize production in the wake of port bottlenecks, parts shortages, port lockdowns, collapsing Chinese demographics, and skyrocketing shipping costs that have wreaked havoc on corporate budgets in the US.

By Ryan Beene (Bloomberg) There has been a sense in financial circles that the fever among American executives to shorten supply lines and bring production back home would prove short-lived. As soon as the pandemic started to fade, so too would the fad, the thinking went. And yet, two years in, not only is the trend still alive, it appears to be rapidly accelerating.

Rattled by the most recent wave of strict Covid lockdowns in China, the long-time manufacturing hub of choice for multinationals, CEOs have been highlighting plans to relocate production — using the buzzwords onshoring, reshoring or nearshoring — at a greater clip this year than they even did in the first six months of the pandemic, according to a review of earnings call and conference presentations transcribed by Bloomberg. (Compared to pre-pandemic periods, these references are up over 1,000%.)

More importantly, there are concrete signs that many of them are acting on these plans.

The construction of new manufacturing facilities in the US has soared 116% over the past year, dwarfing the 10% gain on all building projects combined, according to Dodge Construction Network. There are massive chip factories going up in Phoenix: Intel is building two just outside the city; Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing is constructing one in it. And aluminum and steel plants that are being erected all across the south: in Bay Minette, Alabama (Novelis); in Osceola, Arkansas (US Steel); and in Brandenburg, Kentucky (Nucor). Up near Buffalo, all this new semiconductor and steel output is fueling orders for air compressors that will be cranked out at an Ingersoll Rand plant that had been shuttered for years.

Scores of smaller companies are making similar moves, according to Richard Branch, the chief economist at Dodge. Not all are examples of reshoring. Some are designed to expand capacity. But they all point to the same thing — a major re-assessment of supply chains in the wake of port bottlenecks, parts shortages and skyrocketing shipping costs that have wreaked havoc on corporate budgets in the US and across the globe.

In the past, says Chris Snyder, an industrials analyst at UBS, it was as simple as “if we need a new facility, it’s going in China.” Now, he says, “this is being thought through in a way that has never been done before.”

In January, a UBS survey of C-suite executives revealed the magnitude of this shift. More than 90% of those surveyed said they either were in the process of moving production out of China or had plans to do so. And about 80% said they were considering bringing some of it back to the US. (Mexico has also become a popular choice.)

This is, of course, a nascent trend. And so many manufacturing jobs were lost here over so many decades — about 8 million from peak to trough — that almost no one would argue that the current trend marks a return to those halcyon times. The rise of automation, which has eliminated many low-skilled, low-paid jobs, means US factories today require a much smaller group of workers.

What’s more, the soaring US dollar threatens to curtail the whole thing just as it’s beginning. As the dollar surges against the yuan, yen, pound and euro, it becomes costlier to make goods in the US rather than in those countries.

‘Better and Cheaper’

To Kevin Nolan, the CEO at GE Appliances, all this fretting about high costs in the US is overdone.

It has been for years, he says. Around 2008, he came to realize that on large items — like, say, dishwasher size and up — the savings earned by eliminating overseas shipping could outweigh the extra money spent on labor here. The key, he determined, was to wring maximum efficiency out of the factory floor to keep those labor costs down. A year later, he decided to test the thesis out and moved some of GE’s water-heater production to Louisville. Other product lines followed.

It’s all been such a success for the company — which is now, ironically, owned by China’s Haier Smart Home — that Nolan has been waiting for other CEOs to follow his move. It took a pandemic to convince them to do it.

“I’ve always said, this is just economics, people are going to realize that the savings they thought they had aren’t real,” Nolan said in an interview, “and it’s going to be better and cheaper to make them here.”

For some companies, the first nudge they got to revamp their supply-chain lines came two years before Covid, when then-President Donald Trump began slapping tariffs on Chinese products again and again.

Generac Holdings, a maker of power generators, started mapping out plans to shift some production from China, and when the pandemic hit, those plans got supercharged. The company now gets more of its parts from suppliers in the US and Mexico, produces more generators near its headquarters outside Milwaukee and runs a brand new plant in a small town just north of Augusta, Georgia.

“We wanted to be closer to our customers in the southeast,” said Chief Operations Officer Tom Pettit. Low shipping costs and quick delivery times are proving a hit with clients and paving the way for the company to keep growing, he said. Opened just a year ago, expansion work on the plant is already underway.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also got Pettit’s attention.

Not just because the war further snarled global trade and added to the surge in freight costs but because it reminded him that China could try something similar in Taiwan. And in the same way that business ended for most Western companies in Russia, so too it could end in China. Suddenly, that benign geopolitical backdrop that had helped encourage so many executives to globalize their operations over the past few decades was vanishing. And this, Pettit said, added to his sense of urgency to change things up.

“President Xi Jinping has not been shy about wanting to reunify China and Taiwan,” Pettit said. “We still think China is incredibly competitive. However, we need to have dual sources outside of China.”

https://gcaptain.com/china-deglobalizat ... tory-boom/

Θα ρίξουμε ΠΟΛΥ γέλιο με τους τραμπίστες που θέλανε να φέρουν την παραγωγή πίσω. Τώρα οι τραμπίστες θέλουν ισχυρή Ρωσία και Κίνα μαζί να νικήσουν την Δύση και έπειτα να ξαναπαγκοσμιοποιηθεί η οικονομία, γιατί το να δίνεις κώλο στον πούτλερ είναι καλό

[Λαχουρένιος]

Φυσικά, ακόμη κι έτσι, τα κόστη δεν συγκρίνονται με το να παράγεις στον 3ο κόσμο. Έτσι, έπειτα απο μια σχετικά μακρόσυρτη κούρσα πληθωρισμού, οι τιμές θα σταθεροποιηθούν σε υψηλά επίπεδα συγκριτικά με τα τις προηγούμενες λίγες δεκαετίες του ξέφρενου παγκοσμιοποιητικού πάρτι. Αυτό δεν είναι απαραίτητα κακό, καθώς αρκετά προϊόντα θα σχεδιάζονται να κρατούν περισσότερο και να μπορούν να ενσωματώνουν αναβαθμίσεις, με ένα πιο βιώσιμο μοντέλο δηλαδή.

Πως προκυπτει αυτο?

[Προέλλην]

Φυσικά, ακόμη κι έτσι, τα κόστη δεν συγκρίνονται με το να παράγεις στον 3ο κόσμο. Έτσι, έπειτα απο μια σχετικά μακρόσυρτη κούρσα πληθωρισμού, οι τιμές θα σταθεροποιηθούν σε υψηλά επίπεδα συγκριτικά με τα τις προηγούμενες λίγες δεκαετίες του ξέφρενου παγκοσμιοποιητικού πάρτι. Αυτό δεν είναι απαραίτητα κακό, καθώς αρκετά προϊόντα θα σχεδιάζονται να κρατούν περισσότερο και να μπορούν να ενσωματώνουν αναβαθμίσεις, με ένα πιο βιώσιμο μοντέλο δηλαδή.

Πως προκυπτει αυτο?

Overview of EU measures to make sustainable products the norm in the EU.

https://ec.europa.eu/info/energy-climat ... roducts_en

Green Deal: New proposals to make sustainable products the norm and boost Europe's resource independence

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/pressco ... ip_22_2013

European consumer goods companies that adopt a circular business model view extending product life through repair, resale, refurbishment, and recycling as an opportunity for growth rather than a threat.

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/con ... lion-euros

Tεράστια Ε.Ε., έτη φωτός μπροστά


Meanwhile τα πρακτοράκια του πούτλερ θέλουν να επιβάλουν Goblin Town στον πλανήτη:

[Προέλλην]

Aρχίσαν το κλάμα οι κινέζοι

Semiconductor chips are perhaps the best example of what a globalised market can achieve.

At the core of electronic devices, they enable advances in telecommunications, computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, transport, medical equipment and military systems.

Demand and the cost and complexity of production have created highly specialised global supply chains and open trade to ensure components can be quickly manufactured and shipped to where they are needed.

Washington’s belief that China’s involvement in the industry threatens national security and its push to decouple through boosting domestic manufacturing threatens technological advances while carrying a significant price tag for companies and consumers.

Technology has been a key area of concern for the United States as it tries to maintain geopolitical, economic and military dominance. Legislation known as the Chips and Science Act, approved by Congress and set to be signed into law by President Joe Biden, intends to go a significant way towards that aim.

Semiconductor chips are perhaps the best example of what a globalised market can achieve.

At the core of electronic devices, they enable advances in telecommunications, computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, transport, medical equipment and military systems.

Demand and the cost and complexity of production have created highly specialised global supply chains and open trade to ensure components can be quickly manufactured and shipped to where they are needed.

Washington’s belief that China’s involvement in the industry threatens national security and its push to decouple through boosting domestic manufacturing threatens technological advances while carrying a significant price tag for companies and consumers.

Technology has been a key area of concern for the United States as it tries to maintain geopolitical, economic and military dominance. Legislation known as the Chips and Science Act, approved by Congress and set to be signed into law by President Joe Biden, intends to go a significant way towards that aim.
US Senate passes Chips and Science Act to compete with China’s semiconductor industry

The US semiconductor industry would receive more than US$52 billion in grants for research and manufacturing and support for regional technology hubs.

Further funding aims to limit the scope of Chinese telecommunications firms. In another move, the US and Japan have agreed on a joint research centre to develop next-generation chips.

Biden’s administration and that of his predecessor, Donald Trump, have already tightened export curbs, placed China’s top chip manufacturer SMIC and other leading technology firms on the US commerce department’s trade restriction list, and blocked Chinese companies from acquiring American counterparts perceived as being strategically important.

Semiconductor chips are perhaps the best example of what a globalised market can achieve.

At the core of electronic devices, they enable advances in telecommunications, computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, transport, medical equipment and military systems.

Demand and the cost and complexity of production have created highly specialised global supply chains and open trade to ensure components can be quickly manufactured and shipped to where they are needed.

Washington’s belief that China’s involvement in the industry threatens national security and its push to decouple through boosting domestic manufacturing threatens technological advances while carrying a significant price tag for companies and consumers.

Technology has been a key area of concern for the United States as it tries to maintain geopolitical, economic and military dominance. Legislation known as the Chips and Science Act, approved by Congress and set to be signed into law by President Joe Biden, intends to go a significant way towards that aim.
US Senate passes Chips and Science Act to compete with China’s semiconductor industry

The US semiconductor industry would receive more than US$52 billion in grants for research and manufacturing and support for regional technology hubs.

Further funding aims to limit the scope of Chinese telecommunications firms. In another move, the US and Japan have agreed on a joint research centre to develop next-generation chips.

Biden’s administration and that of his predecessor, Donald Trump, have already tightened export curbs, placed China’s top chip manufacturer SMIC and other leading technology firms on the US commerce department’s trade restriction list, and blocked Chinese companies from acquiring American counterparts perceived as being strategically important.
Every Saturday

Beijing has understandably responded by hastening efforts for semiconductor self-sufficiency through spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the sector with the aim of producing 70 per cent of the chips needed.

But developing such capability is difficult given how globalised the industry has become; the US leads in knowledge-intensive facets such as design and core intellectual property, 75 per cent of manufacturing is concentrated in South Korea, Taiwan and mainland China, the Netherlands has become a hub for technology and equipment, and most raw materials come from Japan and Mexico.

The disruption to supply chains caused by the pandemic reflects the difficulty, with chip production shortfalls last year impacting the global manufacture of household and personal appliances, vehicles and computers.

The cost of decoupling from China is high for US companies and workers. Many US allies reject severing Chinese trade links. Future innovation for the industry would also be harmed. Washington needs to reconsider the wisdom of its strategy.

https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/ar ... gn=3187499